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5ARTICLE
COURT OF APPEALS DYNAMICS IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF A SUPREME 
COURT RULING 
STEPHEN L. WASBY*
INTRODUCTION
Examinations of the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the U.S. courts of appeals usually look “down” at the impact of 
* B.A., Antioch College; M.A., Ph.D. (political science), University of Oregon. Professor 
Emeritus of Political Science, University at Albany—SUNY.  Residing in Eastham, Mass. Contact: 
wasb@albany.edu. 
  The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ninth Circuit Senior Judge Alfred T. 
Goodwin for access to his papers and the case files on which this Article is based, as well as his 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and to Virginia Hettinger, University of Connecticut, for 
raising useful questions.  An earlier version of this Article was presented to the American Political 
Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5, 2010. 
  The author’s interest in the border-search cases goes back at least to the late 1970s, when 
one of his students at Southern Illinois University—Carbondale, Michael Wepsiec (now States 
Attorney for Jackson County, Illinois), conducted an honors study of cases involving the “founded 
suspicion” necessary for a stop in border searches.  The work is reported in Michael Wepsiec & 
Stephen L. Wasby, Ninth Circuit Border Searches: Doctrines and Inconsistencies (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
  The reader should note that the author reviewed the Goodwin Papers while conducting 
research for this Article; the unpublished documents cited here are available in the Goodwin Papers, 
which are held at the Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.  The author has made every effort 
to ensure the accuracy of citations to, and quotations from, those documents, but the author notes 
that the editors of the Golden Gate University Law Review have not had the opportunity to review 
the documents from the Goodwin Papers cited or referred to here. 
  Unpublished dispositions were read in slipsheet form—the only form in which they made 
available during the period studied—at the Ninth Circuit headquarters courthouse in San Francisco. 
  Unless otherwise specified, all those named as senders or recipients of memoranda are or 
were judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. “Associates” refers to all the judges 
of the court. 
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single Supreme Court decisions on subsequent lower court rulings; not 
even the related cases the Justices dispatch with grant-vacate-remand 
(GVR) orders are taken into account.  The implicit assumption seems to 
be that the relationship is both direct and simple, with later lower-court 
rulings embodying the substance of the Supreme Court’s opinion.  
Matters are, however, far from being quite so simple.  A Supreme Court 
ruling, particularly if not unanimous, may require interpretation.  In 
addition, more than one Supreme Court case may be simultaneously in 
play, cases may also be moving between the two courts, and cases likely 
will be at various stages in the appellate process at the time of the 
Supreme Court’s primary ruling.  This sets up a dynamic situation. 
Studies of the effects of the U.S. Supreme Court on lower federal 
courts usually focus on outcomes (affirm or reverse) and, to a lesser 
extent, on whether lower courts’ opinions reflect or are out-of-sync with 
the Supreme Court.  The effect of the Supreme Court is regularly
understated because it misses several elements and particularly the lower 
courts’ lower-visibility actions (or non-actions), which are no less 
important despite their lower visibility.  Included are the often-extensive 
discussions within the courts of appeals as to the meaning of the 
Supreme Court’s opinions, the pending cases that might have to be 
revisited, and rehearing petitions that will have to be entertained based 
on the new Supreme Court rulings.  Also not much appreciated is courts 
of appeals’ anticipatory deference to the Supreme Court, particularly the 
deferring of action when the Justices are seen as likely soon to issue a 
ruling affecting pending cases, either by having granted certiorari to a 
case containing an issue before a court of appeals panel or even only 
considering granting certiorari to such a case. 
Whether Supreme Court rulings “make a difference” in the lower 
courts, a question not substantially explored by scholars, thus remains an 
open question.  One reason is that we lack information about how a U.S. 
court of appeals actually deals with its superior’s intervention into its 
ongoing work and how it handles the fallout from Supreme Court action.  
A law-changing Supreme Court ruling affects the immediate parties, but 
it also affects many factually similar or legally related cases.  When the 
Supreme Court decision also potentially affects many cases then “in the 
pipeline,” the affected lower court will have to engage in extra activity to 
cope, perhaps recalling mandates in recently decided cases and altering 
outcomes or remanding cases for further proceedings.  These effects 
expand as the Justices return other cases to the circuit for reconsideration 
in light of the primary ruling or if they soon rule on related issues. 
The Supreme Court ruling will also be incorporated into pending 
cases in the court of appeals, which must engage in discussion of what 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss1/6
2011] Inter-Court Dynamics 7 
the Supreme Court meant.  The judges may withdraw submission in 
cases already submitted for decision and call for supplemental briefing, 
or they may instead remand rather than reach a merits disposition.  From 
among cases pending, the court may select one or more to serve as 
vehicles for deciding multiple closely related questions.  With many 
three-judge panels dealing with similar issues, the court may choose to 
sit en banc to maintain consistent results, and multiple en banc rulings 
decided at, or nearly at, the same time may reference each other.  And, in 
the dynamic interaction that develops over time, cases that are both 
before panels and the en banc court may be affected by, and be affected 
by, Supreme Court rulings.  Interaction between the court of appeals and 
the Supreme Court is thus quite dynamic.  An initial Supreme Court 
opinion on a topic is unlikely to answer all questions.  Thus the court of 
appeals judges can anticipate that the Justices will accept cases on 
follow-up questions, and those decisions will occur just as the appeals 
court judges are attempting to assimilate the first ruling, which perhaps 
may cause them to move hesitantly or even to suspend action until the 
Justices have ruled.  Processes such as these may proceed through 
several iterations. 
This Article provides an examination of such complex dynamic 
interaction in the aftermath of the key 1973 border-search case of 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.1  In that aftermath, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where that case originated, had to cope 
with a mix of fast-developing Fourth Amendment law and the uncertain 
law of retroactivity as well as the effects in the many recently decided or 
pending appeals stemming from searches of varying intrusiveness at or 
near the border, at fixed checkpoints, whether permanent or temporary at 
a given location, or by roving patrols.  The resulting question of 
retroactivity made the dynamics more complex: Was Almeida-Sanchez to 
be applied to pending cases and, if so, to those where searches pre-dated 
Almeida-Sanchez, to convictions on appeal when it was decided, or to 
recently-decided rulings not yet final because rehearing was possible?  
All this was made more difficult as several more Supreme Court rulings 
came down while the court of appeals was trying to sort out matters. 
What we see is, first, a story interesting in its own right for what it 
has to say with respect to the development of the law of search and 
seizure, and of border searches in particular, and also for contemporary 
concerns about “control of the border.”  However, we also see a picture 
that may well be more generally indicative of the inter- and intra-court 
1 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (warrantless search by roving 
patrol away from border is not statutorily authorized border search and violates Fourth Amendment). 
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dynamics that transpire in areas of law with high volumes of cases that 
are at various stages of the appellate process when the Supreme Court 
hands down a major ruling announcing new rules of law. 
This Article proceeds in chronological fashion but only roughly so; 
a chronological baseline is provided to aid the reader, and analysis of 
aspects of Supreme Court-court of appeals interaction is presented.  The 
Article is based not only on court opinions but also on case files in the 
papers of Senior U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, which 
contain communications among the judges as they decided cases; these 
materials provide necessary gritty texture to the usual portrayals of 
courts.  Judge Goodwin’s papers are especially significant here because 
he served as the court’s en banc coordinator, responsible for monitoring 
and facilitating the judges’ communication.2  While the full court 
participated in the process of selecting cases for en banc treatment in the 
Almeida-Sanchez “backwash,”3 the en banc coordinator, working in 
concert with the chief judge and his colleagues, played a particularly 
important role.  He did so not only by serving as the communication 
node for the court’s judges but also by helping direct cases for en banc 
consideration and even by selecting some of them. 
In the description and analysis that follow, one will see—and should 
be on the lookout for—a number of elements in the relationship between 
the U.S. courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.  It is certainly clear 
that the Supreme Court has a great effect on later cases in the lower 
appellate courts.  Thus, upon the Supreme Court’s handing down a 
relevant decision, a court of appeals will reconsider its own rulings on 
the basis of that decision or will remand to the district courts so that they 
may do so.  While that might be considered obvious, there is also, as will 
be seen in what follows, considerable evidence that judges of the U.S. 
courts of appeals wait for the Supreme Court to act.  Indeed, cases 
decided after a major Supreme Court ruling may well have been held 
until that ruling was issued.  So, instead of plunging ahead, a court of 
appeals may well hold back to await further developments once cases on 
point have been tendered to the Justices for possible review, in what we 
might call anticipatory deference.  Likewise, we see that, within the 
court of appeals, some panels may also defer action until “lead” cases on 
a subject are decided, with cases selected for en banc hearing—even 
2 For a more complete treatment of the work of the en banc coordinator, see Stephen L. 
Wasby, “A Watchdog for the Good of the Order”: The Ninth Circuit’s En Banc Coordinator, 12 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91 (2011). 
3 The term was used in a memorandum from Chief Judge Richard Chambers to Associates 
(Jan. 28, 1975). 
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before panel ruling—to assist all panels in their work.  And we will see 
as well another way in which the court of appeals defers to the Supreme 
Court, when it facilitates the moving of cases to the high court, perhaps 
by prompt en banc hearing of cases, which it may do even before panels 
have completed their work. 
THE BEGINNING: ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ AND ITS GVRS
Toward the end of its 1972 Term, the United States Supreme Court 
handed down its ruling in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.4  (See 
timeline at 46.)  Justice Stewart, writing for a five-Justice majority, 
reversed the Ninth Circuit, revoking the carte blanche of 8 U.S.C. § 
1357,5 and held that a warrantless search of an automobile by a roving 
patrol at a point at least twenty miles from the border, without probable 
cause or consent, was not a border search authorized by federal law.6
Recognizing that “national self protection reasonably requir[es] one 
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his 
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in,” the Justices 
upheld the constitutionality of border searches at the physical border or 
its functional equivalent.7  While joining the majority opinion, Justice 
Powell wrote separately to note that this case did not involve “the 
constitutional propriety of searches at permanent or temporary 
checkpoints removed from the border or its functional equivalent,”8 thus 
indicating matters with which the lower courts would have to deal.  Not 
only was Justice Powell’s opinion to be debated, but the date of the 
Court’s decision—June 21, 1973—was to become central to much 
subsequent Ninth Circuit activity. 
Like all other border-search cases discussed here, the case had 
originated in the Southern District of California.  The panel majority, 
Judges James Carter and Ozell Trask, had affirmed a conviction for 
importing marijuana, in a four-paragraph per curiam opinion.9  They 
recognized that the search was not a “border search” but held that the 
4 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266. 
5 The statute, inter alia, allows immigration officers, without a warrant, to interrogate and 
arrest aliens and suspected aliens, and to search and board vessels.  The relevant regulation spoke of 
searches within 100 miles of the border.  See 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (Westlaw 2011). 
6 The actual stop was twenty-five miles north of the border.  Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 
268. 
7 Id. at 272 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1924)). 
8 Id. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring). 
9 United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), rev’d, 413 
U.S. 266 (1973). 
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federal statute and regulation allowed it and found the search reasonable 
in scope.  In his extensive dissent, Judge James Browning recognized, 
“Of course, prior decisions of other panels of this court bind this panel.”  
However, he felt that those rulings were “so clearly at odds with the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment that they should be overruled.”10
It was Judge Browning’s position that Justice Stewart basically adopted. 
In dealing with border searches before Almeida-Sanchez, the Ninth 
Circuit had adopted some standards.  One was “continuous surveillance,” 
in which a search of a vehicle away from the border would be upheld if 
the vehicle had been under continuous surveillance since it crossed the 
border.  Also adopted was the related test that a search would be valid if 
the totality of circumstances persuaded the factfinder with a “reasonable 
certainty” that the contraband seized had been on board the vehicle from 
its crossing of the border.11  However, the court had moved toward 
approving checkpoint searches as if they were border searches, with 
Judge Browning saying, “We simply upheld all alien searches within 100 
miles of the border . . . . The fact that some of the searches may have 
occurred at a checkpoint was irrelevant.”12  As the Supreme Court, while 
issuing some denials of certiorari, had not intervened in the Ninth 
Circuit’s border-search work, one could be “safe in saying that Almeida
is the first time the Court has spoken since the 9th Circuit took it upon 
itself to develop new law re border searches.”13
As soon as the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez, two issues 
were raised, and they were to pervade the subsequent cases.  One was 
whether fixed checkpoints were within Almeida-Sanchez’s ambit.  It was 
raised by one of the court’s more senior members, Judge Fred Hamley, 
who quoted from the Supreme Court’s opinion and asserted that “the 
Court included checkpoint searches as well as searches by roving 
patrols.”14  However, in a theme that recurred in Ninth Circuit discussion 
over the next few years, he did note “observations” about the lead 
opinion in Justice White’s dissent and Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion “to the effect that Almeida-Sanchez does not involve permanent 
10 Id. at 461 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
11 United States v. Alexander, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966); see Memorandum from 
Barbara Reeves (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) (n.d.). 
12 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Sept. 1, 1973).  This would to tend 
to indicate that ideologically the court was relatively homogeneous on this matter.  However, some 
aspects of search law, such as what constituted “founded suspicion” for a search, did produce 
disagreement within the court, particularly between its two most liberal members, Walter Ely and 
Shirley Hufstedler, and their more conservative colleagues. 
13 Memorandum from Barbara Reeves to Judge Goodwin (n.d.). 
14 Memorandum from Fred Hamley to Judges Eugene Wright, Charles Powell (E.D. Wash.), 
and Associates, (Aug. 1, 1973) (re United States v. Schlect, No. 72-2445). 
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or temporary checkpoints.”15  The other issue was retroactivity.  Within a 
few weeks of the Supreme Court’s ruling, a judge wrote to the en banc 
coordinator, Judge Goodwin, “I am not sure if it was ever decided what 
case we are waiting for on the decision of retroactivity,” and noted that “I 
have couple of cases waiting.”16
The Supreme Court also returned two cases to the Ninth Circuit for 
reconsideration in light of Almeida-Sanchez.  In Foerster v. United 
States, after certiorari had been granted in Almeida-Sanchez but a year 
before the Supreme Court’s decision, a panel of Judges Browning, 
Merrill, and Wright, speaking per curiam and citing the court’s own 
Almeida-Sanchez ruling, had held that immigration officers may stop and 
investigate cars for concealed aliens without probable cause.17  After the 
GVR, Judge Browning, who had “been assigned the writing of an 
opinion . . . involving the question of Almeida-Sanchez’s applicability to 
searches at ‘fixed checkpoints,’” thought the proper course was to 
remand cases like Foerster (there were others as well) to the district 
court “to determine whether a search at the relevant checkpoint was the 
‘functional equivalent’ of a border search within the meaning of Justice 
Stewart’s plurality opinion.”18  His law clerk drafted an opinion, but, 
showing the interrelationship between various cases in the court of 
appeals, suggested it be filed only if Judge Goodwin were to hold 
Almeida-Sanchez retroactive to appeals pending when that case was 
decided.19  Judge Browning, who proposed to wait for a Judge Goodwin 
opinion “holding that the rule of Almeida-Sanchez is to be applied to 
pending appeals,”20 said he was “content to await Judge Goodwin’s 
views on both issues.”21
The other post-Almeida-Sanchez GVR was Bowen v. United 
States,22 the ruling for which Judge Browning would wait.  At first this 
15 Id.  In a July 12, 1973, memorandum, Judge J. Clifford Wallace quoted Justice White’s 
dissent and Justice Powell’s concurrence in support of his position that Almeida-Sanchez
encompassed no more than roving patrols.  Judge Browning was to disagree, objecting on Sept. 1, 
1973, to Judge Wallace’s calling Justice Stewart’s opinion “the plurality opinion” when, for 
Browning, it was “the opinion of the Court.” 
16 Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 12, 1973). 
17 Foerster v. United States, 455 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1972), reh’g denied Mar. 15, 1972, cert.
granted, vacated, remanded, 413 U.S. 915 (1973). 
18 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Alfred T. Goodwin, Charles Merrill (Aug. 31, 
1973). 
19 Memorandum from Jim Babcock (law clerk to Judge Browning) to Browning (Aug. 28, 
1973). 
20 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Aug. 15, 1973). 
21 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Sept. 1, 1973). 
22 United States v. Bowen, 462 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. granted, vacated, 
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case seemed relatively insignificant, but it was to become one of the 
Ninth Circuit’s first en banc rulings on border searches and the court’s 
focal case in Almeida-Sanchez’s immediate aftermath, and it would also 
return to the Supreme Court.  Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
Almeida-Sanchez but before Supreme Court arguments, a panel of 
Circuit Judges Charles Merrill and Alfred Goodwin and District Judge 
Lawrence Lydick (C.D. Cal.) had, per curiam, affirmed a conviction for 
smuggling marijuana and other drugs on the basis that the evidence was 
sufficient to uphold the convictions.23  The panel’s one sentence about 
the search (“The search and seizure were plainly lawful.”24) was in effect 
a holding that stops by an immigration officer at a fixed checkpoint 
station were valid under § 1357.25
A third Supreme Court GVR in light of Almeida-Sanchez,
Chambers v. United States, came at the beginning of the Supreme 
Court’s next Term.26  It had been an unpublished affirmance of a 
conviction also from the Southern District of California in which the 
challenged search had taken place in 1972.27  In an indication that the 
complex development of border search and retroactivity law could delay 
final action in cases, after the Supreme Court’s remand the Ninth Circuit 
panel of (former) Chief Judge Chambers, Judge Herbert Choy, and 
District Judge William Sweigert (N.D. Cal.) took until April 5, 1977, to 
dispose of the case by affirming the district court because Almeida-
Sanchez “does not retroactively apply to fixed checkpoint searches which 
occurred prior to the date that case was decided.”28
EN BANCS
The Supreme Court’s Bowen remand began a period of considerable 
Ninth Circuit en banc activity, with several en banc cases proceeding in 
parallel.  Activity in Bowen is a thread tying together the Ninth Circuit’s 
post-Almeida-Sanchez border-search cases.  At one point, a judge noted 
that the court had taken seven cases en banc to deal with various 
elements posed by the Almeida-Sanchez “problem.”29  This is what 
remanded, 413 U.S. 915 (1973). 
23 Bowen, 462 F.2d 347. 
24 Id. at 348. 
25 Id.
26 Chambers v. United States, 414 U.S. 896 (1973) (granting cert., vacating, and remanding). 
27 United States v. Chambers, No. 73-1028. 
28 United States v. Chambers, 554 F.2d 1071 (1977). 
29 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974) (re United States v. 
Bowen, No. 72-1012). 
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activ
Judge Goodwin, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc coordinator, called a 
“dreadful glut” of such cases.30  The en banc coordinator had the duty of 
enforcing court rules, particularly deadlines for circulation of memos 
about en banc rehearing, and of superintending the voting on whether to 
rehear a case en banc.31  As Chief Judge Richard Chambers had asked 
Judge Goodwin to take the position not long after Goodwin joined the 
court in 1971, during decision of the border-search cases he was “a 
rookie en banc coordinator.”32  During this period, the Ninth Circuit en 
banc was the full court, not the more limited en banc panel (LEB) used 
starting in 1980, so all the judges were involved in all border-search 
cases that were proceeding simultaneously during this period of
ity. 
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit received news that the Supreme 
Court had GVR’d Bowen, Judge Goodwin noted that the case had 
already been discussed at a meeting of court and council33 and indicated 
the need for a comprehensive opinion in the case.  His position: “I cannot 
conceive of any basis for refusing to apply Almeida-Sanchez to cases 
pending on appeal at the time the Supreme Court issued its opinion.”34
He pointed to “[t]he manner in which the Supreme Court summarily 
vacated Bowen and remanded it for consideration in light of Almeida-
Sanchez,” which he said “would seem to answer the question whether 
Almeida-Sanchez was intended to apply to pending cases.”35  As he put 
it, “The Supreme Court evidently thinks Almeida-Sanchez applies to 
cases that had been decided in our court, and, a fortiori, would apply to 
cases still on appeal in our court.”36  Not only did his law clerk disagree 
with him on this point,37 but Chief Judge Chambers also took a poke, 
taking a dim view of court-wide memoranda on the meaning of “The 
judgment is vacated and remanded for consideration in the light 
30 Email from Alfred T. Goodwin to author (Apr. 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
31 See Stephen L. Wasby, “A Watchdog for the Good of the Order”: The Ninth Circuit’s En 
anc C
ile wearing 
eir ad
T. Goodwin to Judge Wallace, Judge William Byrne (C.D. 
al.), and Associates (July 16, 1973). 
B oordinator, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91 (2011). 
32 Email from Alfred T. Goodwin to author (Apr. 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
33 At that time, the circuit council consisted of the court’s active judges sitting wh
th ministrative hats.  District judges were to be added to the circuit council in 1980. 
34 Memorandum from Alfred 
C
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Memorandum from Don Friedman (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) to Judge Goodwin (Aug. 
6. 1973) (“I don’t think that we can draw any inference about how the Court felt that Almeida-
Sanchez was to be applied. To my mind, all that the Court was doing was remanding . . . to consider 
hethew r or not Almeida-Sanchez was to be given retroactive effect.”). 
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own, and this case assignment became effective on 
Augu
of . . . .”38  Even before the Supreme Court’s GVR order was received, 
the panel agreed that Judge Goodwin would get the case when the 
mandate came d
st 2, 1973. 
Discussion quickly took place as to whether to take cases en banc 
and which cases to hear en banc that would present an issue cleanly.  
Some ideological differences were reflected in approaches put forth, but 
the focus was on the need to set forth clear statements of the law, and this 
diminished the role of judges’ ideological propensities.  Judge J. Clifford 
Wallace disagreed with Judges Fred Hamley and James Browning on the 
need to remand cases to determine if a checkpoint was the functional 
equivalent of the border.  He also noted that there was intra-circuit 
disagreement, particularly that Judge Browning’s proposed approach in 
Foerster was at odds with the approach to be taken in several cases in 
which Judge Wallace was in the majority.39  Judge Ben Duniway 
“supposed that this is the kind of situation in which we ought to go in 
banc, since there seems to be a pretty sharp disagreement as to the effect 
of Almeida-Sanchez on searches at fixed checkpoints and at temporary 
checkpoints.”40  However, he now felt that a panel should rule “one way 
or the other and . . . then we should all follow the decision whether we 
agree with it or not.”  If the Supreme Court “doesn’t like our solution it 
can change it,” he said.41  Ten days later, Judge Duniway agreed that if 
the court “can get one lead case on both the retroactivity issue and the 
checkpoint issue, it will save us a lot of trouble.”42  Still later, in the 
context of the retroactivity of fixed checkpoint searches, he was again to 
propose that all other panels hold their cases for decision until one lead 
case was decided, which other panels would follow.43  His view was 
echoed by Chief Judge Chambers: “My notion has been to ask someone 
to go ahead as the lead panel and the rest of us to stay our hands.”44
Earlier, Chambers had said he couldn’t “imagine . . . proposing en banc” 
but shortly afterward he said that, in the border-search cases before him, 
38 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 18, 1973).  He said, 
“[A]s I see it you are free to consider retroactivity in Bowen and I think it should be resolved on the 
s
ereto
allace to Associates and senior judges (Aug. 27, 1973). 
orandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Aug. 31, 1973).  “In banc” was Judge 
basis of whether Almeida-Sanchez more nearly fits the cases where the Supreme Court ha
th fore given retroactivity or made such a ruling prospective.” 
39 Memorandum from J. Clifford W
40 Mem
Duniway’s preferred spelling. 
41 Id.
42 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973). 
43 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (July 21, 1975). 
44 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (July 28, 1975). 
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adowed his dissent from the court’s action granting en banc 
heari
an en banc decision,53 and Judge Duniway threw several into the hopper,  
he would follow the Bowen panel without taking the case en banc.45
This foresh
ng.46
As this discussion within the court continued, judges increasingly 
commented on the fact that many border-search cases were in a state of 
suspension because of undecided Almeida-Sanchez issues.  At first, 
individual cases were noted and others in a “holding pattern”47 were 
continually added to the list.  When, as en banc coordinator, Judge 
Goodwin wrote to his colleagues about four cases relating to the 
“functional equivalent” (of the border), Judge Hamley added one and 
noted yet another in an Addendum, and Judge Joseph Sneed followed the 
next day with mention of two more,48 one of which, Brignoni-Ponce,
was to become both an en banc and a Supreme Court case.49  Then a list 
created by one of Judge Browning’s law clerks50 led Judge Goodwin’s 
chambers also to list all the twenty-four cases, suggested by various 
judges, with an indication of their status such as whether they had been 
remanded to the district court.  Other members of the court continued 
over the next weeks to suggest cases with which they were familiar.51
Some of the cases were already known, at least to Judge Goodwin, but 
Judge Trask suggested the Grijalva-Carrera case,52 which later became 
45 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 18, 1973); 
e Court would take it and that en banc hearing 
 485 F.2d 1388, 1388 (9th Cir. 1973) (Chambers, C.J., dissenting 
om gr
, 1973), and in a memorandum from Judge Goodwin to all active judges, others 
ec. 1
 to Associates (Sept. 13, 1973); memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Sept. 
4, 197
ited States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), aff’d, 422 U.S. 
73 (19
ed information of the location of 
ted by Judge Wallace. Memorandum from J. Clifford 
allac
3).
anc) (per curiam). 
memorandum from Richard Chambers to Shirley Hufstedler, Associates (July 23, 1973).  Chief 
Judge Chambers was generally opposed to en banc rehearing, a view not all judges shared.  He felt 
that if a case was sufficiently important, the Suprem
would delay getting that case to the Supreme Court. 
46 United States v. Bowen,
fr ant of rehearing en banc). 
47 The term was used in a memorandum from Judge J. Clifford Wallace to Alfred T. 
Goodwin (Oct. 11
(D 4, 1973). 
48 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973); memorandum from 
Fred Hamley
1 3). 
49 Un
8 75). 
50 Memorandum from David Raish (law clerk to Judge Browning) to James T. Browning 
(Sept. 14, 1973). In an intriguing bit of research, Raish obtain
checkpoints, by telephone, from the regional counsel of the INS. 
51 See, for example, a list of six submit
W e to Alfred T. Goodwin (Oct. 1, 1973). 
52 Memorandum from Ozell Trask to Alfred T. Goodwin, Richard Chambers (Oct. 12, 197
53 United States v. Grijalva-Carrera, 500 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1974) (en b
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along
uthern District of California, they thus came from a small number 
of d
ting to 
gove
 with comments as to their status, in light of the need for checkpoint 
cases.54
Judge Duniway presented another list of cases in connection with 
the question of the retroactivity of the court’s own Bowen ruling,55 and 
Chief Judge Chambers both reported a “group of 21 cases in the slip-
stream of Almeida-Sanchez that panels of the court have been holding” 
and also said, “We must have about 40 cases in the backwash of the . . . 
Supreme Court decisions.”56  He again touched on the volume of 
affected cases in a subsequent remark that “altogether we will have 50 
petitions for rehearing on retroactivity.”57  Judge Shirley Hufstedler 
supplied another list, this time on the question of the retroactivity of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Ortiz case,58 and Judge Duniway added 
still more.59  The lists shifted somewhat as some issues were resolved 
and new cases came into the picture, but as almost all cases were from 
the So
istrict judges, making basically irrelevant which district judge had 
decided a case. 
Throughout this process, the judges’ concern was not merely one of 
accounting for cases but of taking consistent actions.  Thus, after the 
Bowen en banc ruling, when the government filed “a boiler-plate request 
for an open-ended stay of the mandate while the Solicitor General picks a 
case for certiorari,” the en banc coordinator suggested that “[i]n the 
interest of uniformity,” all affected panels allow stays of only thirty days 
“or a stay of the mandate until some day certain.”60  Judge Duniway 
suggested that “we have ought to have a uniform policy” in reac
rnment requests for extensions of time to file,61 and the judges 
agreed to have Chief Judge Chambers issue an appropriate order. 
When Judge Goodwin continued discussing which cases should be 
taken en banc, he reported “two problems in Bowen: retroactivity and 
checkpoint search,” while another possible en banc case, Gordon, had 
only retroactivity.62  After Goodwin circulated a proposed panel opinion 
54 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Oct. 16, 1973). 
55 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (July 21, 1975). 
56 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Jan. 22, 1975). 
57 Memoranda from Richard Chambers to Associates (July 28, 1975) (two on same date). 
58 Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Oct. 2, 1975).  See United States v. 
rtiz, 4 ng text. 
.
owen panel, Judge Stanley Barnes and 
istric
O 22 U.S. 891 (1975), discussed infra, at notes 138–42 and accompanyi
59 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Oct. 3, 1975). 
60 Memorandum from Alfred to Goodwin to Associates (June 4, 1974)
61 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Jan. 16, 1975). 
62 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to the B
D t Judge Robert Kelleher (C.D. Cal.) (Aug. 28, 1973). 
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pects of the 
prob
in Bowen, there were scattered votes to go en banc, but the panel itself 
then called for an en banc vote, using the opinion to support the call.63
This led a judge who voted to en banc the case to suggest that “we might 
consider taking one or two others that present different as
lem,”64 and another proposed taking a post-Almeida-Sanchez en 
banc in case the court were to decide against retroactivity.65
At its next court meeting, the judges agreed to en banc Bowen, but 
Chief Judge Chambers, believing strongly that en banc rehearing would 
impede the case’s inevitable arrival at the Supreme Court, dissented.66
He again spoke out on the matter in early 1974, “I do think the situation 
is such that we should get our rulings out promptly so the Supreme Court 
can take our cases.”67  To facilitate this, he suggested announcing 
decisions with opinions to follow,68 and Judge Choy agreed with that 
suggestion “if this will expedite getting the matters to the Supreme 
Court.”69  As Judge Chambers was to remark a bit later, “All I wanted 
was for panels to take various cases [and] get them decided and on the 
way to the Supreme Court,” particularly where, in his view, “in this 
Almeida chaff, we have never been anything but a way station.”70
However, even though some colleagues seemed to agree that the 
Supreme Court would have the last word,71 that specific idea was 
rejected.72
As it appeared that Judge Wallace had a majority in Bowen and that 
Judge Goodwin would dissent, further extensive discussion among the 
judges led to a combined opinion dealing with, and thus reconnecting, 
63 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973). 
485 F.2d 1388, 1389 (9th Cir. 1973) (Chambers, 
J., di
orandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Jan. 25, 1974). 
traighten this out.”  Letter from Alfred T. Goodwin to Reynaldo 
arza (
ll 
64 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Sept. 18, 1973). 
65 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Sept. 19, 1973). 
66 “None of the earmarks of the normal case for en banc are here. It is inescapable that the 
Supreme Court will decide the questions here. They are too big and too far reaching for that Court to 
ignore them. This en banc hearing results in about a three-months’ delay in the case getting to the 
Supreme Court,” with district courts meanwhile “almost choked with the retroactive [retroactivity] 
question.”  In his inimitable style, he ended, “Taking this case en banc is simply flying off into the 
air without a payload.”  United States v. Bowen, 
C. ssenting from grant of en banc rehearing). 
67 Mem
68 Id.
69 Memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (Jan. 28, 1974). 
70 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Apr. 9, 1974). 
71 See, for example, Judge Goodwin, writing to a judge in another circuit: “I do think the 
Supreme Court is going to have to s
G S.D. Tex.) (June 24, 1974). 
72 See the comment of Judge J. Clifford Wallace: “I do not think it looks well for our court to 
have a matter under submission as long as this, and then file an order indicating that an opinion wi
follow later, when we could have done so long ago.”  Memorandum to Associates (Jan. 30, 1974). 
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 retroactivity, believing that 
Alme
both issues in one case.  That became more necessary as the voting in 
Gordon had shifted and resulted in an evenly divided court.73  Thus, in 
Bowen, in two separate 7-6 votes, the court held, first, that immigration 
officers could not search vehicles at fixed checkpoints without probable 
cause or a warrant, thus applying Almeida-Sanchez to those locations, 
but, second, that Almeida-Sanchez should not apply prior to the date of 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in that case.74  On the first point, Judge 
Goodwin, using the “reasonable certainty” test, argued that the fixed 
checkpoint search in the case was not a search at the functional 
equivalent of the border, as the Supreme Court defined it in Almeida-
Sanchez.  Dissenting, Judge Wallace, who would have remanded to the 
district court to determine the search’s reasonableness, pointed to the 
facts that only four Justices had outlawed searches at fixed checkpoints 
not at the border or its functional equivalent and that Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion was at best limited to roving stops.75  Judge Wallace 
then wrote the majority opinion for those judges who would have limited 
the new decision’s retroactivity, reasoning that Almeida-Sanchez was 
new law, as it overruled precedent concerning fixed checkpoints; 
moreover, freeing those persons arrested prior to June 21, 1973, the date 
of Almeida-Sanchez, would not deter future inappropriate police 
activity.76  Judge Hufstedler disagreed as to
ida-Sanchez did not establish new precedent, and even if it did, that 
would not be pertinent to its retroactivity.77
Bowen came during the key period for Ninth Circuit border search 
en banc decisions of May and June 1974.  Two cases—Bowen and 
United States v. Peltier78—were handed down on May 9, and three more 
came down on June 14.  There had been no panel ruling in Peltier.  It 
was thus an “initial en banc,” that is, without a formal disposition first 
having been filed by the panel.  The case was taken en banc at the April 
10 court and council meeting for the purpose that, as Judge Goodwin 
stated in his proposed opinion, “the full court can consider whether the 
rule announced by the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez should be 
applied to similar cases pending on appeal on the date the Supreme 
Court’s decision was announced.”79  With the court again dividing 7-6,
73 There is no record of this action in the Federal Reporter; perhaps no formal filing was 
ade. 
(9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam). 
m
74 United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 
75 Id. at 981 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 965. 
77 Id. at 982 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
78 United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
79 Draft opinion (n.d.), in casefile.  In a memorandum during later en banc activity in a case 
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the majority did apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to roving border 
patrol search cases in which appeals were pending on June 21, 1973, on 
the basis that Almeida-Sanchez did not overrule precedent,80 while Judge 
Wallace repeated his view that it did establish new law and argued that 
Stovall v. Denno,81 permitting prospective application only, should 
apply.82  The interrelation between the various cases the court was 
considering en banc could again be seen in a comment by Judge 
Goodwin’s law clerk that “the court decided that Peltier and Bowen
would go down as separate, self-sufficient opinions with neither one 
citing the other,” but Judge Wallace’s Peltier dissent “quotes extensively 
from his majority opinion in Bowen.”83
Several other en banc rulings were part and parcel of this 
considerable activity.  In one, the court was unable to resolve the 
question posed because the en banc court divided evenly.  In that case, a 
panel had withheld submission of a case until after the Supreme Court 
decided Almeida-Sanchez.  A panel member then wrote to his colleagues 
that if the report of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Los Angeles 
Times were true, the district court would have to be reversed, but in a 
companion case the result would be affirmance, as the latter case 
involved a checkpoint.84  Judge Goodwin, a member of the panel, 
agreed, as the stop had been on the same highway as the stop in Almeida-
Sanchez, but said that case “leaves checkpoint searches to another 
day.”85  The panel, quoting from Justice Powell’s concurrence, ruled in 
an unreported order that the Supreme Court’s ruling required reversal of 
a conviction from a roving search.  However, within a month, before the 
mandate was issued, the panel withdrew its order “when the government 
pointed out that the retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez had not been 
on standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, Judge Goodwin wrote to his colleagues, 
“Members of the court will recall that a good deal of paperwork was occasioned by the failure of our 
court to deal with the retroactivity problems in the slipstream of Almeida-Sanchez.  The Supreme 
Court eventually solved our problem, but there was still a lot of paper shuffling connected with the 
operation.  It is hoped that we can avoid some of this by focusing on these problems on a pre-need 
basis.”  Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Sept. 9, 1977) (re Cooper v. 
Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc)).  The judge more recently has referred to the 
“tedious retroactivity question” that faced the court in the border-search cases.  Email from Alfred T. 
, 17:30 EDT) (on file with author). 
m from Donald Friedman (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) to Judge Goodwin 
pr. 1
 United States v. Gordon, 
o. 73-
Goodwin to author (Apr. 14, 2010
80 Peltier, 500 F.2d 985. 
81 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
82 Peltier, 500 F.2d at 990 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
83 Memorandu
(A 9, 1974). 
84 Memorandum from Stanley Barnes to panel (June 22, 1973) (re
N 1524). The other case was United States v. Hendrix, No. 73-1523. 
85 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel (June 26, 1973). 
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conceded”86 and asked the parties to brief the retroactivity question.  At 
year’s end, the entire court withdrew the case from the panel for en banc 
consideration, “for the purpose of deciding whether in a roving search 
case coming under the decision in Almeida-Sanchez, the Almeida-
Sanchez decision is retroactive.”87  This was consonant with Judge 
Goodwin’s earlier suggestion that the court consider separating the 
retroactivity question “from the other compound questions involved in 
the ‘functional equivalent’ cases,”88 and Gordon had been one of the 
cases he noted. 
Then, illustrating that en banc rehearings don’t always resolve 
matters, changes within the court served to preclude a decision on the 
question for which the case had been en banc’d.  This problem stemmed 
from courts of appeals not always having an odd number of sitting 
judges, coupled with any senior judge being able to sit on en banc 
rehearing of the case.  Thus, even with an odd number of active judges, 
adding a senior judge to the en banc court might produce a tie vote, 
something that happened in Gordon.  One of the panel members, Senior 
Judge Stanley Barnes, had been thought to favor retroactivity.  Had he so 
voted, an 8-6 vote in that direction would have resulted.  However, he 
changed his position, with the result that “we have an evenly divided 
court and there is nothing to do with Gordon except to affirm by an 
equally divided court,” 7-7.89  That, said Judge Duniway, “leaves the 
question of retroactivity in roving search cases still up in the air, a result 
that none of us wanted to have happen.”90  When the court of appeals 
later considered whether to appoint a lawyer for Gordon to file a 
certiorari petition, another Supreme Court case, holding that there was no 
right to a lawyer at that stage of the proceedings,91 came into play.  One 
judge predicted wrongly that “no doubt the Supreme Court will 
recognize this as a cert case a mile off—without a lawyer’s help,”92 and 
certiorari was denied on June 30, 1975.93
Gordon may have failed of resolution, but it illustrates the 
interconnectedness of the court’s en banc rulings on border searches.  In 
his revised Bowen opinion, Judge Goodwin applied Almeida-Sanchez to 
fixed checkpoints and then applied the retroactivity rule of the parallel 
86 As reported by Alfred T. Goodwin, memorandum to all active judges, others (Dec. 1973). 
87 As explained later in a memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Mar. 29, 1974). 
ec. 14, 1973). 
 Associates (Mar. 29, 1974). 
es (July 16, 1974). 
5).
88 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to all active judges, others (D
89 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Mar. 29, 1974). 
90 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to
91 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
92 Memorandum from James Browning to Associat
93 Gordon v. United States, 422 U.S. 1057 (197
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pending Gordon en banc ruling to fixed checkpoints.94  The close 
connection was also clear when Judge Hufstedler complained 
simultaneously about Judge Wallace’s dissents in both cases as “contrary 
to the controlling authority of Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion for a 
majority of the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez,” with a 
“misread[ing of] the effect of Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion” 
there.95  Judge Duniway made clear the difficulties caused by that 
interconnectedness: “We originally agreed that the retroactivity problems 
would be settled in the Gordon case and that the fixed checkpoint 
problem would be settled primarily in the Bowen case” and “we 
separated the two cases for that reason.”96  However, another judge had 
said Judge Wallace “proposes that we do not reach the issue of the fixed 
checkpoint.”97  Judge Duniway feared that Judge Wallace’s proposed 
majority opinion would mean that “all of the work, discussion, etc. of 
thirteen of us on the fixed checkpoint question will go down the drain.  
That
in order to 
make
 is a hell of a way to run a railroad.”98
Also in play was the seemingly technical matter of which case was 
to be filed first, as the first case to be filed would govern those following 
and might foreclose certain rulings in them.  The en banc coordinator 
thus proposed to his colleagues that several en banc rulings be filed 
simultaneously.99  Before Gordon fell by the wayside, there was even a 
relatively sharp exchange between two judges as to whether Gordon or
Bowen would be filed first, with a disputed claim that an agreement had 
been reached on the matter.100  However, other judges made clear that 
they wished to avoid a rush to file but wanted the matter handled 
systematically and by agreement.  For example, as Judge Duniway put it, 
“I think it is not good for us to have a race to the clerk’s office 
 our personal views the law of the circuit in this area.”101
In the situation left by Gordon, the judges began to consider other 
cases—on which Judge Barnes had not served—that would present the 
retroactivity question without complications.  One of Judge Merrill’s law 
clerks, writing about a “clean Almeida-Sanchez type case” that could be 
94 See supra, text accompanying notes 74–76. 
95 Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Feb. 19, 1974). 
96 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974). 
97 Memorandum from Charles Merrill to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974). 
98 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974). 
99 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Stanley Barnes, Associates (Apr. 16, 1974). 
100 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Apr. 1, 1974) (Gordon to be filed 
first); memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates (Apr. 8, 1974) (no such recollection, and 
explanation of events). 
101 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973). 
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used as a substitute for Gordon, thought that Peltier “might be suitable as 
an en banc substitute . . . to dispose of the Almeida-Sanchez retroactivity 
issue,” although Peltier “is not as pure as Almeida-Sanchez itself.”102
A case that the court did take en banc led to a clear outcome on one 
point, the status of the San Onofre (San Clemente) checkpoint on I-5 
sixty-five miles north of the Mexican border.103  Slightly over two weeks 
after the Supreme Court handed down Almeida-Sanchez, the case was 
heard by a panel of Judges Goodwin and Wallace and District Judge 
William M. Byrne, Sr. (C.D. Cal.).  The panel decided to affirm the 
marijuana conviction, but Judge Goodwin’s law clerk argued that 
Almeida-Sanchez was not limited to roving searches “but rather applies 
to all surveillance by the Border Patrol along inland roadways as distinct 
from searches at the border itself or its functional equivalents.”104  When 
Judge Byrne circulated his proposed opinion on October 9, the clerk 
made the same point again, more directly: “This opinion can not stand. 
Apparently at the time that it was decided and assigned, the panel 
thought that Almeida-Sanchez did not apply to fixed checkpoint 
searches. Judge Byrne never got the word that times have changed.”105
Saying he would concur, Judge Wallace thought Judge Byrne’s opinion 
should be held “until we have taken the various Almeida-Sanchez issue 
cases en banc.”  He then went further to suggest that Judge Goodwin 
“might consider taking this one en banc because it is a permanent 
checkpoint and has no other significant issues” that would muddy the 
waters.106
By month’s end, the court ordered the case reheard en banc in 
conjunction with Bowen, with Chief Judge Chambers dissenting from 
this action as he had in Bowen.107  In June 1974, a month after deciding 
Bowen en banc and the same day that the Brignoni-Ponce en banc 
decision was handed down, in United States v. Morgan an 11-2 en banc 
court, in a very brief per curiam opinion written by Judge Goodwin, held 
that the San Onofre checkpoint was not the functional equivalent of the 
border, under Almeida-Sanchez and Bowen.108  However, because Bowen
had held Almeida-Sanchez not applicable to fixed checkpoint searches 
102 Memorandum from Stephanie [no last name] (law clerk) to Charles Merrill (Apr. 1, 1974); 
confirmed in memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Apr. 3, 1974). 
103 The checkpoint is the San Clemente checkpoint, which is in San Onofre. 
104 Memorandum from Don Friedman (law clerk) to Judge Goodwin (Aug. 22, 1973) (re 
United States v. Morgan, No. 73-1669). 
105 Memorandum from Don Friedman to Judge Goodwin (Oct. 9, 1973). 
106 Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to panel (Oct. 12, 1973). 
107 Order filed Oct. 31, 1973, United States v. Morgan, No. 73-1669. 
108 United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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) dissented 
on th
 en banc “because it appears to 
be A
prior to June 21, 1973, and because the search in the case took place 
before that date, suppression did not apply and the conviction was 
affirmed.109  Judge Wallace (joined by Chief Judge Chambers
is point, saying there was an inadequate basis for deciding that the 
checkpoint was not the functional equivalent of the border.110
The en banc court also held, in another per curiam, United States v. 
Grijalva-Carrera, that when there was no indication of a border patrol 
checkpoint and a border patrol agent parked alongside a road where he 
could turn on his headlights and observe the occupants of passing cars 
and had instructions to stop all northbound vehicles after dark, a search 
of a car was a roving patrol search prohibited by Almeida-Sanchez.111  A 
panel of Chief Judge Chambers, Judge Ozell Trask, and District Judge 
Byrne had initially affirmed by unpublished memorandum on November 
12, 1972.  Almost a year later, on October 12, 1973, Judge Goodwin’s 
secretary, while she thought the case “technically not in the en banc 
active track yet,” notified the judges about denial of rehearing and 
provided the possibility for them to seek
lmeida-related.”   Over another Chambers dissent, the court 
shortly thereafter took the case en banc. 
Judge Goodwin told his colleagues that the case presented “two 
complications” in the way of a clean resolution of the retroactivity 
question: all cars, not just some, were being stopped, making the location 
“a de facto temporary checkpoint,” and the government “can argue that 
this was a Terry-stop to check identification, because it was in a ‘high 
crime’ area.”   Nonetheless he circulated another proposed per curiam 
opinion while setting out several options for disposition of the case and 
selecting one “for the pragmatic reason that this is the one the author 
would vote for.”   The individual views that he hoped his proposal 
would prompt were expressed, as Judge Sneed raised questions about the 
status of temporary checkpoints, some of which could be little more than 
roving patrols.  However, the court adopted the Goodwin proposal, an
112
113
114
d
the opinion came down after the circuit’s Peltier ruling but before the 
Supreme Court’s consideration of that case.  Because this case was on  
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1351 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
111 United States v. Grijalva-Carrera, 500 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam). 
112 Memorandum from Helen Murdock (secretary) to Alfred T. Goodwin and clerks (Oct. 12, 
1973). 
113 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 28, 1974) (memo in Bowen
file).
114 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (May 16, 1974). 
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appe
 Judge Duniway, 
altho
al when the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez, the circuit’s 
Peltier decision on retroactivity applied.115
The Supreme Court did not deal with Morgan, Grijalva-Carrera, or 
Gordon.  However, it did take up another June 14, 1974, en banc ruling 
on a conviction for transporting aliens.  This was another case with no 
three-judge panel ruling, but in which the full court, on October 13, 
1973, ordered an en banc hearing, Judge Goodwin said, “I don’t want to 
seem officious, but the case turned up among those being ‘coordinated,’” 
and he offered to write the opinion if Judge Duniway—the most senior 
judge participating—“wants to assign it to me.”116
ugh saying that he “doubt[ed] that I have any authority to assign it,” 
accepted the “invitation” and made that assignment.117
Judge Goodwin had first noted that this case “may have to be more 
than a summary statement of facts” with citations to Almeida-Sanchez
and Peltier, because of the “significant issue” of whether someone 
believed to be an alien could be stopped and interrogated about that 
matter, something the Tenth Circuit had ruled permissible.118  The 
judge’s law clerk thought the case “closely keyed to the result in 
Grijalva-Carrera,”119 on certain stops being more like those by roving 
patrols than those at fixed checkpoints, and Judge Goodwin himself 
reported that he had “started to prepare a perfunctory memorandum to 
dispose” of the case.  However, he said that “two controversial problems, 
one or more of which may be under consideration by other panels,” one 
being the Tenth Circuit’s position, led him to a more complete proposed 
opinion.120  Further illustrating the interrelation between pending cases, 
Judge Goodwin discussed Judge Sneed’s reservations in the pending 
Grijalva-Carrera en banc about the status of temporary checkpoints, 
which Judge Goodwin wished to resolve “without taking another case en 
banc.”121
Accepting Judge Goodwin’s approach, the Ninth Circuit 
unanimously reversed the conviction.122  The opinion first tied the case 
115 United States v. Grijalva-Carrera, 500 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (en banc). 
116 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to the panel (Judges Duniway and Sneed, and 
District Judge William Sweigert [N.D. Cal.]) (May 15, 1974) (re United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
No. 73-2161). 
117 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Goodwin and panel (May 17, 1974). 
118 United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973). 
119 Memorandum from Donald Friedman (law clerk) to Judge Goodwin (May 21, 1974). 
120 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (May 22, 1974). 
121 Id.
122 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
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necessary for a proper stop) that 
those in the car were illegal aliens, the ruling that was to be the core of 
 be appropriate 
on th
to the court’s own Peltier ruling making Almeida-Sanchez retroactive to 
all cases involving roving patrol stops pending on appeal as of the date of 
Almeida-Sanchez; because the car had not been stopped at the 
checkpoint, the situation was more like a roving patrol than a fixed 
checkpoint stop.123  Then, dealing with the government’s claim that the 
case involved not a search but a stop to interrogate about alien status, 
Judge Goodwin declined to take the Tenth Circuit’s view, which he 
found “entirely inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Almeida-Sanchez” and “with settled law of this circuit” as well.124  There 
was, he said, no “founded suspicion” (
the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case. 
Return to Panel.  The Ninth Circuit initially voted to take en banc two 
other cases to resolve outstanding questions but then returned the cases 
to their panels for disposition.  In one of those cases, District Judge 
Robert Peckham (N.D. Cal., sitting by designation) told his panel 
colleagues to say that, for him, the difference between roving patrols and 
temporary and fixed checkpoints was “a distinction without a 
difference.”  He suggested that he might write separately in this case, as 
he preferred resting the ruling on the Ninth Circuit’s Almeida-Sanchez
decision, which had criticized stops in all three situations, rather than 
relying on “a fifth Justice’s neutral statement” (referring to the Powell 
concurrence) that the case didn’t involve fixed and temporary 
checkpoints.125  Peckham’s message led fellow panel member Judge 
Charles Merrill to write to en banc coordinator Judge Goodwin, “It 
begins to look as though the vote of the whole court might
is question.”126  The court then withdrew the case from the panel 
and that case became involved in the Bowen proceedings. 
The court decided that Judge Goodwin would write a per curiam 
opinion applying Almeida-Sanchez to the San Onofre checkpoint, based 
on the reasoning of the then-in-process Bowen.127  Indeed, Judge 
Goodwin circulated a proposed (unpublished) memorandum disposition.  
However, he then almost immediately communicated that he had written 
the disposition because he thought it “involved only a housekeeping 
123 Id. at 1110. 
124 Id. at 1111. 
125 Memorandum from Robert Peckham (N.D. Cal.) to panel, United States v. Heiden/United 
States v. Klein, No. 73-1471/73-1570 (Aug. 1, 1973). 
126 Memorandum from Charles Merrill to Alfred Goodwin, others (Aug. 14, 1973). 
127 Internal memorandum in Heiden/Klein case folder (Dec. 18, 1973). 
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matter controlled by the Bowen retroactivity issue,” when instead the 
panel might want to deal with issues in the case other than Almeida-
Sanchez retroactivity.  For unexplained reasons, the order returning the 
case to the panel was not issued until after mid-July 1974.  On December 
16, 1974, the panel resolved the case on the basis that the stop, which in 
any
turned the case to the panel, which then 
ruled the search valid because it took place on March 8, 1971, before the 
.129
SUPR
 or 
seizu
event had occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s Almeida-Sanchez 
decision, was valid.128
The other case involved three defendants convicted of conspiracy to 
import marijuana.  The panel (Judges Barnes, Goodwin, and J. Blaine 
Anderson) had held the case pending the Supreme Court’s determination 
of Almeida-Sanchez.  They then decided not to apply that ruling because 
the stop in the case was at a checkpoint, not by a roving patrol.  The 
court took the case en banc.  However, after handing down Bowen,
applying Almeida-Sanchez to fixed checkpoints only prospectively, and 
Morgan, holding that the San Onofre checkpoint was not the equivalent 
of the border, the en banc court re
crucial date of June 21, 1973
EME COURT RULINGS
If the May–June 1974 period was the key time for Ninth Circuit en 
banc rulings, it was late June 1975 when the Supreme Court weighed in 
heavily on border searches.  The Court focused in Peltier on retroactivity 
and held, by a 5-4 vote, with Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and 
Marshall dissenting, that Almeida-Sanchez was not retroactive to a case 
pending on appeal on the date Almeida-Sanchez was announced.  Justice 
Rehnquist said, “[I]f the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in 
good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial” or that 
their conduct was within the law, the “imperative of judicial integrity” 
was not offended by introduction of that evidence or material seized 
through such conduct “even if decisions subsequent to the search
re have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass” the evidence 
or had held that the conduct “is not permitted by the Constitution.”130
128 United States v. Heiden/United States v. Klein, 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974). 
129 United States v. Mollet, 510 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1975).  The account here is from that 
opinion; there is no Federal Reporter citation for the panel’s initial ruling.  Judge Anderson, 
disagreeing over a sentencing issue, concurred in part and dissented in part.  At some point, the 
Mollet case had produced another evenly divided en banc court, see memorandum from Alfred T. 
Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 28, 1974), but that was before the case was resolved by returning it to 
the panel. 
130 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1975). 
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ase applied to searches at checkpoints” —that is, 
the d
’s limitation 
to th
The Court then affirmed the Bowen non-retroactivity ruling, so that, 
as to roving patrols, the rule of Almeida-Sanchez would apply from June 
21, 1973.131  For the majority, Justice Powell said that, as the court of 
appeals had correctly decided that Almeida-Sanchez was not to be 
applied retroactively, “it should have refrained from considering whether 
our decision in that c 132
ecision extending Almeida-Sanchez to traffic checkpoint searches 
was unnecessary.133
In the Brignoni-Ponce case, which demonstrates the interplay 
between the two courts that is at the heart of their interaction dynamics, 
Justice Powell again wrote for the Court, affirming the Ninth Circuit.  
The timeline for this case is of some note.  As Justice Powell 
acknowledged, the appeal from the conviction was pending in the Ninth 
Circuit when the Supreme Court handed down Almeida-Sanchez.134  The 
government had not challenged the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of 
the stop of Brignoni-Ponce as equivalent to one by a roving patrol, the 
court’s treating San Clemente as not the functional equivalent of the 
border, or its holding on retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez.  The key was 
that the Court now held that a roving patrol could not stop a car near the 
border to question about immigration status where apparent Mexican 
ancestry was the only ground for suspicion.135  Thus, other than at the 
border or its functional equivalent, one could stop cars only on 
articulable facts that gave rise to reasonable inferences, and if suspicion 
led an officer to believe a car had aliens, the officer could stop the 
vehicle and question briefly about citizenship.136  Justice Rehnquist, 
while joining the majority opinion, focused on that opinion
e particular type of stop involved, and Justice Douglas joined the 
judgment but disagreed with the majority’s “suspicion” test. 
The Supreme Court also affirmed the decision in another border 
patrol case, United States v. Ortiz.137  This had been a Ninth Circuit 
unpublished disposition invalidating a search at the San Clemente 
checkpoint by officers who lacked reasons for suspecting that the car 
they stopped contained illegal aliens; the appeals court had also held that 
probable cause was needed for all vehicle searches, whether conducted at 
131 Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975). 
132 Id. at 921 (1975). 
133 Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the basis of 
their Peltier dissents, and Justice Stewart dissented without comment. 
134 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975). 
135 Id. at 886-87. 
136 Id. at 889. 
137 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). 
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” ruling meant that justifying investigatory stops at 
chec
checkpoints or by roving patrols.  Again speaking through Justice 
Powell, the Court held that “at traffic checkpoints removed from the 
border and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private 
vehicles without consent or probable cause.”138  Four Justices wrote 
three separate concurrences; two concurred only in the judgment, with 
only the compulsion of precedent keeping all in the majority.139  Justice 
Rehnquist complained of the extension of Almeida-Sanchez’s “unsound 
rule”;140 Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Blackmun, complained 
of the difficulty of stopping the influx of illegal aliens; and Justice 
White, also joined by Justice Blackmun, said that the majority’s “largely 
foreordained
kpoints without probable cause or reasonable suspicion would be 
difficult.141
The Justices used GVR orders to return two other cases to the Ninth 
Circuit for reconsideration in light of both Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz.142
The cases involved convictions for marijuana possession with intent to 
distribute that had been affirmed in unpublished dispositions by 
overlapping panels.143  On remand, both panels affirmed the district court 
in published opinions.  The panel of Judges Carter, Wallace, and 
Jameson acted first, holding on December 5, 1976, that officers had 
reasonable suspicion that alien smuggling was occurring when they made 
their stop one-and-one-half miles from the border in an area “notorious” 
for alien smuggling.144  After having “re-examined the facts of this case 
in light of the[] recent Supreme Court cases” and having discussed the 
cases,  the judges found no substantive difference between the Ninth 
Circuit’s “founded suspicion” test and the “reasonable suspicion” test the 
Supreme Court had enunciated in Brignoni-Ponce; they then ruled that 
the officers had that “reasonable suspicion.”145  On January 26, 1976, the 
other panel (Judges Wallace, Koelsch, and Jameson), in a brief per 
curiam, cited the previous case for the equivalence of the tests and 
138 Id. at 896-97. 
139 See id. at 898 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion, 
which was joined by Justice Blackmun, is reported at United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
899, 899 (1975).  Justice White’s concurring opinion, which was also joined by Justice Blackmun, is 
reported at id. at 914. 
140 Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 898 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
141 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 915 (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
142 Rocha-Lopez v. United States, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975); Gonzalez-Diaz v. United States, 422 
U.S. 1053 (1975). 
143 Judges Carter and Wallace and District Judge William Jameson (D. Mont.); Wallace, 
Jameson, and Judge Oliver Koelsch. 
144 United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1976). 
145 Id. at 476-77. 
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om its previous unpublished order.  Judge 
Koelsch noted in his dissent that the record did not support “founded 
se.146
THE
hat became necessary 
when
repeated key language fr
suspicion” in this ca
LATER CASES
All was not yet completed.  A late 1975 memorandum from Judge 
Shirley Hufstedler indicated not only many cases but many categories of 
cases (she listed seven) that were yet to be decided.147  To cover all 
issues, she suggested a published opinion for each of several categories 
and memorandum dispositions for the other categories and all non-lead 
cases.  And there was to be another Supreme Court border search ruling 
and two more en banc matters, one of which had commenced in 1974 but 
was not resolved until early 1977,148 and another t
, as had happened with Gordon, the first failed to produce an 
outcome on the issue it was intended to resolve.149
The first of the en banc cases, Martinez-Fuerte, involved 
convictions of several defendants for transporting aliens, stopped at the 
seemingly ubiquitous San Clemente fixed checkpoint and diverted to a 
secondary area.  The panel majority of Judge Duniway and District Judge 
Stanley Weigel (N.D. Cal.) affirmed the district judge’s order 
suppressing evidence from the ensuing interrogation and reversed the 
conviction.150  Judge Duniway wrote that a warrant of inspection 
allowing stopping all cars without probable cause or even the Ninth 
Circuit’s “founded suspicion” test did not justify otherwise unreasonable 
searches and that, indeed, a traffic immigration checkpoint under an 
inspection warrant was constitutionally unreasonable.151  “Talking back” 
to a Supreme Court Justice, Judge Duniway indicated that he was 
troubled by Justice Powell’s proposal of an administrative inspection 
analogy for roving patrols, and he rejected as “unsatisfactory” Powell’s 
premise that an area warrant would justify a fixed checkpoint.152  Judge 
146 United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 528 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  For the Ninth 
Circuit “founded suspicion” cases and particularly the use of unpublished dispositions in such cases, 
see Michael Wepsiec & Stephen L. Wasby, Ninth Circuit Border Searches: Doctrines and 
Inconsistencies (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
147 Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Oct. 2, 1975). 
148 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
149 United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974) (panel), withdrawn, 568 
F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1976). 
150 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 428 U.S. 543 
(1976). 
151 Id. at 314. 
152 Id. at 318. 
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that
the panel affirmed the conviction and remanded the 
other
probable cause, the stop and search of defendant’s car at the San 
Clemente checkpoint violated Fourth Amendment rights.  As the search  
Carter, dissenting, would, on the basis of the magistrate-issued warrant, 
have upheld the stop, the limited visual inspection, and the occasional 
resulting interrogation.153  Reviving the question of what the Supreme 
Court had said in Almeida-Sanchez, he said the panel majority made it 
seem as if Justice Powell was alone, but “a breakdown of votes” showed 
a majority of the Court (Justice Powell concurring and Justice White 
and colleagues in dissent) would support the government’s action here.154
When Martinez-Fuerte reached the high court along with a Fifth 
Circuit case,155 Justice Powell noted the Ninth Circuit panel’s focus on 
the constitutionality of the warrant of inspection under which the 
checkpoint was operating.156  However, for the Supreme Court, the 
question was vehicle stops at fixed checkpoints for brief questioning, 
even when the stop was made without reason to believe the vehicles 
contained illegal aliens.  Justice Powell said this question had been 
reserved in Ortiz, and the government had preserved it in the court of 
appeals.157  Powell held for a 7-2 court (Justices Brennan and Marshall 
dissenting) that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the 
challenged stops and questioning.  When the Ninth Circuit received the 
case on remand, 
 two defendants’ cases for further proceedings under the Supreme 
Court’s ruling.158
Juarez-Rodriguez, the en banc case that had begun first, was to lead 
to the same result as in Gordon—an evenly divided court, failing to 
provide a precedential ruling.  After the Ninth Circuit’s Bowen en banc, a 
panel of Chief Judge Chambers, Judge Browning, and District Judge 
Fred Taylor (D. Idaho) had reversed another conviction in a short per 
curiam on May 21, 1974.159  Citing the Ninth Circuit’s Almeida-Sanchez
and Bowen rulings, the panel said that without founded suspicion and
153 Id. at 323 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
154 Id.  Judge Carter did, however, concede that Justice Powell was not talking about fixed 
checkpoints but about roving patrols. 
155 Sifuentes v. United States, 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1975), rev’d, United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
156 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 549 n.5, 562 n.15 (1976). 
157 Id. at 545. 
158 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 538 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1976). 
159 United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974), withdrawn, 568 F.2d 120 
(9th Cir. 1976). 
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ctivity
“as a
had taken place after June 21, 1973, Almeida-Sanchez’s non-retroa
pplied to fixed alien checkpoints . . . need not concern us.”160
The case became en banc fodder because of a desire for full court 
consideration of a fixed checkpoint search after the date of Almeida-
Sanchez but before May 9, 1974, the date of Bowen.  In early May 1974, 
Judge Goodwin had agreed with suggestions by Judges Browning and 
Trask to take en banc a fixed checkpoint case, but he thought the court 
and council should discuss the matter.161  Between the initial panel action 
and this point, the court en banc had transferred the case to a panel of 
Judges Choy, Barnes, and Hufstedler.  This action resulted from Chief 
Judge Chambers’s suggestion that a lead case be taken from among those 
decided by three circuit judges (that is, with no district or out-of-circuit 
judges on the panel); Judges Herbert Choy, Barnes, and Hufstedler had 
been drawn by lot.162  Judge Browning withdrew his en banc suggestion 
when Judge Hufstedler filed her dissent to Judge Barnes’s majority 
opinion for the panel.  The case rested in this posture for almost two 
years without being filed, until Judge Hufstedler called for en banc 
hearing as “the guinea pig case of ‘retroactivity’ of Ortiz . . . affect[ing] 
dozens of cases which we have backed up on the court awaiting the 
determination of the panel.”163  Judge Goodwin then asked the court’s 
judges whether they agreed with the proposed Barnes or Hufstedler 
opinions,164 which differed basically on whether Almeida-Sanchez
extended to fixed checkpoints (Barnes no, Hufstedler yes).165
Here internal court procedure reared its head, illustrating the 
institutional mechanisms playing a part in intercourt dynamics.  First, 
Judge Hufstedler circulated an order, with which many of her colleagues 
concurred, “to unsnarl some procedural snags to get this case sanitized 
for the Supreme Court”—to straighten out some mis-recording 
concerning the order transferring the case (and others) to the special 
panel and correcting an error as to who was on the en banc court, as 
Judge Oliver Koelsch had taken senior status and could not participate in 
160 Id.
161 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (May 2, 1974).  Judge Trask had 
written to his colleagues, concurring with Judge Browning’s suggestion, “to en banc (without 
argument) a post-Almeida-Sanchez situation at a fixed checkpoint, for clarification purposes.”  
emo
marks because, as she stated in her draft dissent, she thought the case 
75).
M randum from Ozell Trask to Associates (Apr. 29, 1974). 
162 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (July 28, 1975). 
163 Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Feb. 23, 1976).  Judge Hufstedler 
put “retroactivity” in quotation 
did not implicate retroactivity. 
164 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 19, 1976). 
165 See, e.g., memorandum from Stanley Barnes to Associates (Oct. 14, 19
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r withdrawing 
the c
me inconclusive disputation as to whether it affected the 
prese
it.166  The next development was a question raised by Judge Choy167 and 
by Judge Hufstedler that was more crucial—whether the en banc court, 
rather than directly taking the case en banc, had the jurisdictional 
authority to transfer to the special panel cases already heard by another 
panel.  The result was, as Judge Hufstedler put it, “a sorry procedural 
morass.”168  Further court consideration, with the case still in limbo and 
issuance of the mandate stayed, led to a July 2, 1976, orde
ase from the special panel, to be considered en banc. 
Difficulties with this case were not yet over, however, in part as a 
result of the time necessary to resolve those procedural issues.  By the 
time of the vote to en banc the case, Judge Barnes had also taken senior 
status, so Chief Judge Chambers assigned to panel member Judge Choy 
the writing of opinion for what had been the Barnes majority panel, and 
Choy wrote based in large measure on what Judge Barnes had stated.  
Further, on June 6, 1975, the Supreme Court decided Martinez-Fuerte,
which led to so
nt case. 
The Juarez-Rodriguez en banc court’s 6-5 decision (Choy for the 
majority, Hufstedler for the dissenters) was first announced on 
November 16, 1976.169  Judge Choy said the question was whether 
Almeida-Sanchez applied to stops, without consent or probable cause, at 
permanent traffic checkpoints not at the border or its functional 
equivalent made after June 21, 1973 (Supreme Court Almeida-Sanchez)
and before May 9, 1974 (Ninth Circuit Bowen en banc)—essentially 
whether Ortiz should be retroactive.  He believed that language in Ortiz
did not indicate that the Court had ruled on checkpoint searches or that 
Almeida-Sanchez held them invalid.  Moreover, Judge Choy said that 
prior to Bowen no holding gave law enforcement adequate notice of the 
unconstitutionality of such fixed checkpoint searches; thus retroactive 
application would be improper.  Judge Sneed disagreed with Judge Choy.  
Sneed thought the Supreme Court had had ample opportunity to hold that 
Ortiz was not retroactive to the period from June 21, 1973, to June 30, 
1975, the date of Ortiz itself, and thus the Supreme Court had selected 
June 21, 1973, as the critical date.  Judge Sneed’s vote had at first been 
considered to be with the majority but when that vote was added to the 
166 Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (May 12, 1976). 
167 Memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (May 27, 1976). 
168 Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (May 24, 1976).  As she put it, “What 
a sorry bog we have found ourselves in by not taking the case en banc in the first place.” 
169 Because of its outcome, as with Gordon, there is no Federal Reporter citation for this case 
and the account of the opinion is drawn from the case files. 
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Hufs
ported that if the court took the case en banc, 
Judg
 with
udge Choy’s view,  Judge Goodwin assigned Judge Choy the court’s 
roposed majority opinion, and the final opinion, filed on May 31,  
tedler dissent, the court was divided evenly, 6-6, and, on January 10, 
1977, the court amended its ruling to show affirmance by that division. 
Even before their final order, the judges realized that they had gone 
to considerable lengths to resolve an issue but had come up empty.  As 
Judge Duniway put it, “Having decided it in a manner that doesn’t 
amount to a precedent, we are no better off than we were before.”170  But 
what to do?  “[T]ake another one of the cases en banc, assuming we can 
find one,” said Judge Hufstedler, who pointed out that it was necessary to 
find a case in which a senior judge had sat on the panel and could thus sit 
on the en banc court to make a court of thirteen judges, which could not 
divide evenly.171  Judge Duniway then noted, however, that when Chief 
Judge Chambers took senior status, the number of active judges would be 
only eleven, facilitating a result in which the court would not be evenly 
divided.172  In searching for cases, Judge Browning found United States 
v. Escalante, which was still pending before the panel of Judges 
Chambers, Browning, and Taylor, which had first heard Juarez-
Rodriguez, and Browning re
e Chambers would opt out of the en banc, providing an odd-
numbered en banc court.173
The Escalante panel had suspended submission of the case and 
then, on May 21, 1974, issued a very brief unpublished memorandum 
reversing the district court, citing Almeida-Sanchez and Bowen.174  When 
Judge Browning’s suggestion that the Escalante case replace the failed 
Juarez-Rodriguez en banc was accepted, Browning, now chief judge, 
assigned the opinions to those who had written in Juarez-Rodriguez.175
As the judges now had information about the voting of judges who had 
participated in Juarez-Rodriguez, it quickly became clear that the 
determining vote would be that of the court’s newest member, Judge J. 
Blaine Anderson, who had not participated earlier,176 and it was 
suggested that Judge Anderson should vote first.  When he sided
177J
p
170 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Dec. 6, 1976). 
171 Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Dec. 3, 1976).
76).
7).
).
172 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Dec. 6, 1976). 
173 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Dec. 14, 19
174 United States v. Escalante, No. 74-1075 (9th Cir. May 21, 1974). 
175 Memorandum from James R. Browning to active judges (Jan. 6, 197
176 See memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (Jan. 7, 1977). 
177 Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (Jan. 27, 1977
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ermanent checking 
searc
sue.   The 
Supreme Court denied review.183
TYPES OF INTERACTION
er certain types 
of ef
1977,178 held that Almeida-Sanchez did not apply to p
hes between that ruling and the Bowen en banc. 
Judge Choy’s majority view was that the Supreme Court’s Ortiz
ruling “neither indicates that the Court at any time previously had ruled 
on checkpoint searches, nor even implies that Almeida-Sanchez held 
checkpoint searches invalid.”179  It was Ortiz that for the first time held 
Almeida-Sanchez applicable to checkpoints not at the border; prior to the 
Ninth Circuit’s Bowen ruling, there was “no holding giving law 
enforcement agencies adequate notice of the unconstitutionality of fixed 
checkpoint searches conducted without probable cause or consent.”180  In 
short, until Ortiz and Bowen, there had been no adequate notice to law 
enforcement.  Judge Hufstedler dissented for several judges to say what 
she had proposed to say earlier in Juarez-Rodriguez: “No retroactivity 
issue is presented by United States v. Ortiz”181 and that case announced 
no new doctrine, so it should be applicable to the cases at is 182
In the interaction between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court 
over border searches, there were, of course, many more cases that did not 
reach the Supreme Court.  But what were the types of interactions 
between the two courts?  A number of these aspects became evident in 
the post-Almeida-Sanchez dynamics, and they are identified here without 
suggesting what would lead to particular effects or wheth
fects would increase after particular judicial rulings. 
Before proceeding to some analysis, we note some additional 
instances in which the Supreme Court’s rulings interacted not only with 
the Ninth Circuit decisions discussed thus far but with other circuit 
precedents, including those on the “founded suspicion” necessary for a 
stop.  In one case, a panel of liberal judges Walter Ely and Shirley 
Hufstedler and a district judge ruled that “founded suspicion” justifying 
178 United States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
179 Id. at 972. 
180 Id. at 972-73. 
181 Id. at 973 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
182 One of Judge Goodwin’s law clerks, Mickey Bierman, had disagreed with the Choy 
opinion and spoke of the problems involved in holding Ortiz non-retroactive.  Memorandum from 
Mickey Bierman to Judge Goodwin (n.d.).  On the memorandum’s face, the judge had written, “I 
agree with Bierman J,” and he joined the Hufstedler dissent, as he had in Juarez-Rodriguez.
183 Escalante v. United States, 434 U.S. 862 (1977), denying cert. to 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 
1077) (en banc). 
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orders without probable cause, and our 
unded suspicion cases permitting stops of vehicles beyond the border 
t without the fruit of the search, successful
prose
atute
autho
upheld as a “border search,” the agents had to have probable cause. 
the stop was lacking.  They noted that “[t]he Government has attempted 
to save this border patrol rover case from the impact of Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States” and the Ninth Circuit’s own Brignoni-Ponce en banc 
“on the ground that the border agent had a founded suspicion justifying 
his making an investigatory stop under the authority of United States v. 
Bugarin-Casas (9th Cir. 1973) 484 F.2d 853.”184  In another case, in 
which the majority held there was founded suspicion, Judge Hufstedler 
wrote separately to say she had to concur “under the compulsion of the 
founded suspicion cases in this Circuit” but went on to observe, “I am 
unable to reconcile the rationale of Almeida-Sanchez . . . forbidding stops 
and searches of vehicles at nonb
fo
on less than probable cause.”185
I. Direct Action.  At times, after a Supreme Court ruling, the court of 
appeals acted directly.  For example, the Ninth Circuit disposed of a 
1974 case by finding the stop of defendant’s car unlawful under both 
Almeida-Sanchez and the Bowen en banc, so that the discovered 
marijuana from the stop and search should have been suppressed.186
Another panel dealing with a stop and search at a fixed checkpoint after 
Almeida-Sanchez said tha
cution was not possible, requiring reversal with instructions to 
dismiss the indictment.187
Despite an apparent inclination to wait for the Supreme Court, the 
court of appeals did not suspend judgment in all instances where 
questions related to Almeida-Sanchez were before the Supreme Court 
and resolved some cases directly on grounds other than those involved in 
the Supreme Court’s ruling.  In one case, the judges, while noting that 
such questions were indeed pending, said they need not delay their 
disposition reversing a conviction.188  The panel judges, using an 
unpublished disposition, said that they assumed that the initial stop and 
search for aliens was valid but agreed that when the search commenced, 
there was no probable cause to search for contraband and the st
rized searches only for aliens.  Because the search could not be 
184 United States v. Madriz-Villaneuva, No. 74-1293 (9th Cir. July 1974).  The Bugarin-
Casas case held that founded suspicion existed when officers saw a low-riding station wagon with a 
compartment that could hide aliens. 
185 United States v. Whitmarsh, No. 74-1881 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 1974). 
186 United States v. Luna, No. 74-1115 (9th Cir. May 21, 1974). 
187 United States v. Thompson, No. 74-1352 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 1975). 
188 United States v. Lopez, Nos. 73-1866, 73-1867 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 1974). 
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or the officer to make the inquiry, which provided probable 
cause.192
There were also convictions affirmed as clearly involving a border 
search and thus not covered by Almeida-Sanchez.189  Other affirmances 
resulted when the defendant failed to raise the Almeida-Sanchez issue at 
trial, particularly after that decision was decided; this was especially 
obvious when the point had not been raised at the time of a trial six 
months after the Supreme Court had ruled.190  Still other efforts to bring 
cases within Almeida-Sanchez were unavailing, and simply claiming that 
a case was a “border search” did not become a talisman for undoing 
convictions.  For example, a panel, finding that a search was of 
abandoned property or a justifiable border search, said that unattended 
golf carts in a no-man’s-land desert area twenty-six miles from a golf 
course provided probable cause for any officer.191  In still another 
instance, the court, explicitly accepting Almeida-Sanchez, affirmed 
because only “reasonable suspicion” was necessary to require a car to 
halt and f
II. Action on Petition for Rehearing.  In some instances, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling was applied to the filing of a petition for rehearing 
(PFR), including some PFRs filed on the basis of the Justices’ decision.  
Examples were unpublished decisions allowing filing of a rehearing 
petition because the facts of the case were within Almeida-Sanchez193 or 
even when, according to the judges, the case was probably 
distinguishable from Almeida-Sanchez.194  In other cases, the court 
granted the government’s petition for rehearing, vacated its prior 
disposition, and affirmed a conviction because of the Supreme Court’s 
1975 ruling in Peltier,195 providing examples of how the court of appeals 
changed its position after the Supreme Court’s ruling in that case.  Two 
other memorandum dispositions were likewise withdrawn and 
convictions affirmed on the authority of Peltier.196  In another instance, a 
189 E.g., United States v. Sanchez, 73-1142 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1973). 
190 United States v. Ratcliff, 74-1931 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1974); see also United States v. 
Castenada-Campos, No. 73-1824 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1973). 
191 United States v. Getchel, No. 73-1868 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1973). 
192 United States v. Perez-Ramos, No. 73-1811 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1973). 
193 United States v. Flores-Ramos, No. 73-1040 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1973). 
194 United States v. Rios-Aguirre, 73-1030 (9th Cir. 1973).  Distinguishing another case, a 
panel rejected an attempt to assimilate the facts in a case to Almeida-Sanchez.  United States v. 
Hernandez-Padilla, No. 73-2225 (9th Cir. 1973). 
195 United States v. Rummonds, No. 73-1751 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 1975); United States v. 
Mammari/United States v. Hutchings, Nos. 73-2340, 73-2391 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1975). 
196 United States v. Ganelin, No. 73-2669 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1975), and United States v. 
Sanchez-Sanchez, No. 73-2343 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1975). 
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n affirmed on the basis of that decision. And the court did 
just t
 held Almeida-Sanchez not applicable to pre-June 21, 
1973
y matter.  One of 
these cases later became the Gordon en banc case.203
panel had reversed a conviction on the authority of Almeida-Sanchez and 
the circuit’s own ruling in Peltier and had remanded for consideration of 
Wilson v. Porter,197 the court’s leading ruling on “founded suspicion” to 
make a stop.198  After receiving the government’s PFR, the court called 
for a response from defendants, one of whom filed a stipulation that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Peltier meant the PFR should be granted and 
the convictio
hat.199
When, in still another case, a defendant did not respond to the 
government’s PFR, the court granted rehearing, withdrew its earlier 
disposition, and affirmed the conviction in another unpublished ruling.200
When a panel had initially reversed a conviction because the court’s own 
Peltier en banc decision had applied Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to 
roving border patrols, the court of appeals granted a government petition 
for rehearing because of the Supreme Court Peltier ruling and vacated its 
prior order.  Affirming the conviction was compelled because the 
Supreme Court had
, searches.201
In addition to applying Supreme Court rulings after a PFR filing, 
court of appeals panels recalled mandates and invited the parties to brief 
the retroactivity question, which in effect extended the period in which a 
PFR could be filed.202  This had the effect of recognizing both the 
application of Almeida-Sanchez itself and a major question not answered 
directly by the Supreme Court’s ruling—the retroactivit
III. Remand After Supreme Court Ruling.  Some panels remanded cases 
for district court consideration of the effect of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, regularly using unpublished dispositions to do so.  Indicative of 
the remands after Supreme Court rulings was one case a panel sent back 
197 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966). 
198 United States v. Gonzales-Rosales/United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, Nos. 73-1533, 72-
1534 (9th Cir. 1974). 
199 United States v. Gonzalez-Rosales/United States v. Bertran-Gutierrez, Nos. 73-1533, 73-
1534 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 1976); United States v. Stark, No. 72-3004, 538 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(table).
200 United States v. Smith, No. 72-3106 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 1976). 
201 United States v. Carpenter, No. 74-1403 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1975). 
202 See memorandum from James Carter to Associates and senior judges (July 20, 1973), and 
memorandum from Richard Chambers to Shirley Hufstedler, Associates (July 23, 1973), indicating 
such action in United States v. Flores-Ramos, No. 73-1040 (9th Cir. July 6, 1973). 
203 United States v. Gordon, No. 73-1524; see memorandum from Stanley Barnes to 
Associates (Aug. 23, 1973). 
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o vacate its suppression order and proceed with 
the t
benefit of the decision of the 
Supr
to the district court for a ruling on the validity of a “stop” in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Ortiz, Bowen, and Brignoni-Ponce.204  As 
well, immediately after the Supreme Court had decided Martinez-Fuerte,
several Ninth Circuit panels remanded cases to the district court for 
reconsideration in light of it, adding in one, “It is indicated that the 
district court will wish t
rial of the case.”205
Many such remands took place concerning Almeida-Sanchez,206
including the then not-yet-reached question of its retroactivity.207  In one 
such remand, the panel said that the district court “will wish to consider 
whether it is a case on inland checkpoints in the slipstream of Almeida-
Sanchez . . . or whether it can rest on grounds independent of the law of 
the validity of required stops at fixed or semi-fixed checkpoints for a 
search for aliens.”  The court also suggested that the case be held for the 
pending Bowen en banc ruling after the Supreme Court had vacated the 
panel ruling there and remanded for further consideration.208  Another 
panel sent a roving patrol case back to the district court on the theory that 
the Supreme Court’s decision might have made a difference because, on 
the record before the panel, one could conclude only that the district 
court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s Almeida-Sanchez ruling, but it “might 
have ruled differently had it had the 
eme Court reversing” that ruling.209
With respect to some cases containing an issue as to Almeida-
Sanchez’s applicability to fixed checkpoints, it was suggested that “the 
proper course is to remand such cases to the district court to determine 
whether a search at the relevant checkpoint was the ‘functional 
equivalent’ of a border search” under Justice Stewart’s opinion.210  In 
one such case, the panel’s author argued that the government’s position 
made it unnecessary to remand for such determinations, but, during the 
time when judges were seeking cases to take en banc, he circulated his 
proposed opinion to the full court and withheld filing it “until all 
204 United States v. DeEvans, No. 74-2358 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1975). 
205 United States v. Arechiga-Moran, No. 75-3383 (9th Cir. July 28, 1976); see also United 
States v. Wise, No. 75-3014 (9th Cir. July 28, 1976); United States v. Diaz-Perez, No. 74-2153 (9th 
Cir. July 28, 1976). 
206 E.g., United States v. Baca, No. 73-2048 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973); United States v. 
Lindsay, No. 73-2205 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973). 
207 United States v. Carpenter, No. 73-2010 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973). 
208 United States v. Holley, No. 73-1079 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 1974). 
209 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to J. Clifford Wallace, District Judge Matthew 
Byrne, Sr., Associates (July 16, 1973) (re United States v. Gonzales-Rodriguez, No. 73-1533, and 
United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, No. 73-1534). 
210 Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Aug. 15, 1973). 
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e to look into the matter and express 
eir own views on the subject.”211
members of the court have had tim
th
IV. Remand in Light of Ninth Circuit Ruling.  The court of appeals also 
remanded in light of its own rulings.  It did this, for example, after its 
Bowen en banc ruling.  Indeed, at least one judge, admitting he had been 
“guilty already of joining in reversal of some Almeida-Sanchez cases” on 
the basis of the court’s Bowen ruling, suggested that the cases be 
remanded, not reversed, because “[t]he Supreme Court usually gives us 
this consideration.”212  Roving border patrol cases on appeal at the time 
of Almeida-Sanchez were remanded for reconsideration under the Ninth 
Circuit’s own follow-up en banc ruling in Peltier.213  Here, the judges 
had more in mind than a routine look at a new case; when they 
remanded, they added, “It seems to be indicated that the judgment should 
be vacated and, if the government has no additional evidence, the 
indictment dismissed.”214  Likewise, in deciding two cases on permanent 
checkpoint border searches in which aliens had been found, a panel 
vacated one for reconsideration under Almeida-Sanchez and Bowen
because the court’s Bowen ruling had applied Almeida-Sanchez to 
permanent checkpoints,215 but it directly affirmed the other because of 
Bowen’s holding that Almeida-Sanchez would not be applied to searches 
that took place before June 21, 1973.216
Cases were also remanded because the questions they raised 
required further lower court action independent of what the Supreme 
Court might say.  Thus in one case, when the court’s Bowen and 
Brignoni-Ponce en bancs applying Almeida-Sanchez to fixed checkpoints 
were “now before the Supreme Court on certiorari” and the related 
Martinez-Fuerte inspection warrant case was also pending, the judges 
said that “ordinarily we might either take this case under submission or 
remand it to the district court, awaiting the decision of the Supreme 
Court.”217  Instead, remand was in order because another Ninth Circuit 
case had distinguished between certain observations of a moving vehicle 
211 Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Judge Walter Ely, District Judge William East, 
Associates (June 12, 1974) (re United States v. Nava-Bibayoff, No. 74-1099/United States v. 
Esquer-Rivera, No. 74-1110). 
212 Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (May 22, 1974). 
213 United States v. Flores-Ramos, No. 73-1040 (9th Cir. June 5, 1974); United States v. 
Rummonds, No. 73-1751 (9th Cir. June 5, 1974). 
214 United States v. Carderon-Trejo, No. 73-2049 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1974). 
215 United States v. Saldana-Hernandez, No. 73-3395 (9th Cir. June 7, 1974). 
216 United States v. Rice, No. 73-2997 (9th Cir. June 7, 1974). 
217 United States v. Vbirros, No. 74-2874 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1975). 
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r defendant’s flight created probable cause; remand was thus in 
rder.
mandate pending action by the Supreme Court in Bowen
and those at a “stop,” and at oral argument, counsel had asked for an 
opportunity to distinguish that case, and the parties had also agreed at 
oral argument that they had not argued another important point related to 
whethe
o
V. Holding Cases Pending Supreme Court Action.  Some panels held 
cases until the Supreme Court acted.  For example, judges waited until 
the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez and then handed down 
their decisions.  One such panel, quoting Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion, affirmed a conviction because Almeida-Sanchez was not
controlling as the search was at a fixed checkpoint,218 and a slightly 
different panel took identical action two days later.219  The court of 
appeals might also defer action for a case the Supreme Court was only 
considering, as one could see when the Ninth Circuit held cases open 
pending the Supreme Court’s rulings in Bowen and Ortiz.  A Ninth 
Circuit judge reported eight cases in which, after acting (affirming or 
reversing) on the basis of the court of appeals’ own rulings, the panel had 
“withheld the 
and Ortiz.”
221
222
223
224
220
In a case involving a pre-Almeida-Sanchez San Clemente 
checkpoint stop lacking probable cause, a panel observed that, under the 
circuit’s own Bowen decision,  the district judge had not erred in 
denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.  However, the panel 
nonetheless stayed the mandate until the Supreme Court rulings in 
Bowen and Ortiz.   The same panel, pointing both to Bowen and to the
panel ruling in Juarez-Rodriguez, also stayed the mandates on finding 
that the trial judge had rightly granted a motion to suppress.   All such 
activity was part of what a law clerk suggested, that one case “should be 
held until the court determines the ambit of the Supreme Court’s rule in 
Almeida-Sanchez.”   And in one of the many cases after Almeida-
Sanchez, a panel held a case pending the Supreme Court ruling and the 
circuit’s own case as to its retroactivity, United States v. Peltier,225 and 
218 United States v. Hendrix, No. 73-1523 (9th Cir. July 9, 1973). 
219 United States v. Ragusa, No. 73-1314 (9th Cir. July 11, 1973). 
220 Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (July 21, 1975). 
221 United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam). 
222 United States v. Holley, No. 74-2997 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 1975). 
223 United States v. Lewis, No. 74-2875 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 1975). 
224 Memorandum from Don Friedman (law clerk) to Judge Goodwin (Aug. 24, 1973) (re 
United States v. Tolbert, No. 73-1941). 
225 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev’d, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). 
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then used those opinions to reverse the conviction,226
227
228
229
 as did panels in a 
number of other instances.   A panel ordered another deferral while 
Martinez-Fuerte  was awaiting Supreme Court decision, and then the 
panel reversed a district court’s suppression of evidence.
VI. Remand for District Court to Hold Case Pending Supreme Court 
Action.  In addition to holding a case until after a Supreme Court 
decision, some panels remanded for district courts to do so in 
anticipation of a Supreme Court ruling.  Superseding a March 1973 
judgment, the court of appeals remanded to allow a defendant to file a 
motion to vacate his conviction because the case was likely to be covered 
by the Supreme Court decisions in Ortiz, Bowen, and Brignoni-Ponce.230
Mixing deferral with its remand, the panel suggested further that the 
district court would want to postpone action until after the Supreme 
Court had acted.231  Another panel took similar action a few days later, 
remanding to the district court to hold the matter open and to rule in the 
eventual light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in those cases.232  When 
a Ninth Circuit panel reversed a conviction on the authority of the 
circuit’s ruling in Martinez-Fuerte, it also remanded for the district court 
to hold the case open pending the Supreme Court rulings in Bowen and
Ortiz as well as the appeal from Martinez-Fuerte itself.233
VII. Anticipation of Certiorari Grant.  Deferral also took place when the 
court of appeals believed that the circuit’s decision was likely to be 
taken to the Supreme Court and granted review.  For example, a 
panel, although originally having reversed a conviction for an offense 
committed prior to Almeida-Sanchez, ordered the decision withheld 
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen and Peltier.234  Once the 
Justices decided in the latter that Almeida-Sanchez should not be 
226 United States v. Hornbecker, Nos. 72-2692, 72-2724 (9th Cir. May 17, 1974). 
227 See, e.g., United States v. Zarate-Briceno, No. 73-2114 (9th Cir. July 18, 1974). 
228 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
229 United States v. Enriquez, 554 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1977) (table). 
230 United States v. Rios-Aguirre, No. 73-1030 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975).  In its earlier 
memorandum disposition affirming (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1973), the court had said one could probably 
distinguish the case from Almeida-Sanchez but that the defendant could ask for a rehearing. 
231 Rios-Aguirre, No. 73-1030 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975). 
232 United States v. Sanchez-Pedraza, No. 74-2786 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 1975). 
233 United States v. Palmanteer, No. 74-2945 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1975). 
234 United States v. Gutierrez, No. 73-3134 (9th Cir. July 14, 1975); see also United States v. 
Zarate-Briceno, No. 73-2114 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1975); United States v. Slosser, 72-2404 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 14, 1975) (vacating the prior disposition and affirming the conviction). 
37
Wasby: Inter-Court Dynamics
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
42 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
retroactive, the panel granted rehearing and affirmed the conviction.235
And, having ruled that defendant’s motion to suppress should have been 
granted on the basis of the court’s own Bowen ruling236 and another 
case,237 the judges stayed the mandate pending the filing of a certiorari 
petition in Bowen or until sixty days after filing of the memorandum 
disposition.  Likewise, when the government conceded that those two 
cases supported the district court’s grant of a motion to suppress because 
the stop at the San Clemente checkpoint came after Almeida-Sanchez and 
was invalid because it was without founded suspicion or probable cause, 
the court also stayed the mandate pending the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Bowen and the related Ortiz case.238  After the Ninth Circuit had held 
Almeida-Sanchez retroactive in Peltier, a Ninth Circuit panel applied it to 
strike down a conviction where the statute and regulation in Almeida-
Sanchez “provided the sole underpinning” for the challenged search and 
stop.239  The panel nonetheless stayed the mandate until the Supreme 
Court disposed of the pending Peltier certiorari petition.240
CONCLUSION
In this story of the aftermath of the Almeida-Sanchez case, there was 
no simple single arrow from a Supreme Court ruling to a single case 
below, but multiple arrows—at first, the Supreme Court ruling plus its 
accompanying GVR decisions, plus its later rulings—striking a host of 
potentially affected cases, and there were overlapping sets of cases in 
play on the status of fixed checkpoints and on the question of Almeida-
Sanchez’s retroactivity.  The dynamics became yet more complex as the 
Ninth Circuit dealt with the first stage of the aftermath of Almeida-
Sanchez, particularly by deciding Bowen en banc.  Thus there is no single 
chronological line to be followed easily, as both the court of appeals and 
the Supreme Court were deciding multiple cases in parallel and 
intersecting ways. 
235 Gutierrez, No. 73-3134 (9th Cir. July 14, 1975). 
236 United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam). 
237 United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974), withdrawn, 568 F.2d 120 
(9th Cir. 1976). 
238 United States v. Olmstead, No. 74-2759 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1974); see also United States v. 
Olmdahl, No. 74-2450 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1974); United States v. Jarvis and Murphy, No. 74-2502 
(9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1974); United States v. Atkinson, No. 74-2040 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 1974). 
239 United States v. Duran, No. 74-1841 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1974). 
240 The Justices subsequently overturned the Ninth Circuit ruling in United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975). 
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Although not cast in terms of the Supreme Court’s impact, this 
Article suggests the great effect that the Supreme Court does have on the 
U.S. court of appeals.  Despite the possibility that lower federal courts 
may thwart the U.S. Supreme Court by avoiding its rulings or at least 
their full implications, the evidence here is quite to the contrary, with the 
Ninth Circuit having followed the Supreme Court’s lead and having 
largely deferred to it.  The courts of appeals maintain considerable 
autonomy because of the small likelihood that the Justices will accept 
any of their cases for review, but they have that autonomy primarily in 
areas of law in which the Supreme Court has not spoken.  Once the 
Justices speak, the lower courts most often follow. 
On the basis of the Court’s initial ruling in Almeida-Sanchez, the 
court of appeals acted directly: convictions were affirmed, or, more 
importantly, reversed.  Many others were sent back to the district court 
for “reconsideration in light of” the Supreme Court’s action.  Other cases 
were held for further developments that would facilitate their resolution, 
so that multiple panels would not each have to do the same work.  And 
we see the court of appeals determining which cases would be most 
appropriate to decide en banc, to provide the cleanest resolution of the 
issues on which other cases depended. 
That the court of appeals held cases for decision points to an 
especially important, and particularly noteworthy, aspect of Supreme 
Court effect: the lower court’s anticipatory deference to the Supreme 
Court.  Such deference held constant across competing judicial 
ideologies (or “agendas”), as both “liberals” and “conservatives” wanted 
key issues, such as whether a ruling on roving patrols applies to fixed 
checkpoints or what was a fixed checkpoint or which rulings were 
retroactive, resolved by the court of appeals so those matters could go to 
the Supreme Court for final resolution, as the judges knew they would. 
The dynamic interaction between the two courts resulted in short-
term delay in handing down judgments in particular cases when panels 
held cases for decision pending en banc rulings or new Supreme Court 
decisions in a string of border search rulings.  Yet, despite apparent 
delay, there is a sense in which cases moved along more quickly overall.  
Not only were a number of cases heard en banc before final panel 
action—not the usual situation—but the court acted to send cases more 
quickly to the Supreme Court by moving to en banc hearing more 
rapidly.  Indeed, some judges argued for speeding cases to the Supreme 
Court by not tying them up for an extended time in the en banc process, 
as they knew that the Justices would have the final word and that these 
issues were quite “certworthy.” 
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As this story is not only about a lead Supreme Court ruling but also 
about several other decisions by the Justices and multiple court of 
appeals en banc rulings within roughly a five-year span, one might ask, 
almost forty years later, how typical is this story.  One answer is, “We 
don’t know,” both because materials that would reveal the sorts of 
dynamics portrayed here have not been accessible and in large measure 
because such dynamics have not been the focus of scholars, who have 
looked at the effect of single cases on results in cases below.  In many 
areas of the law, the Supreme Court decides a case and then does not 
accept another case on the subject for quite some time, unlike the 
situation portrayed here as to the law of border searches.  In areas of the 
law in which there are relatively fewer cases, such as antitrust, one can 
imagine a major Supreme Court antitrust ruling having effects on U.S. 
court of appeals decisions, but there are simply not that many antitrust 
cases proceeding in the lower courts at any one time in which immediate 
and substantial effects would be registered.  Or, after enactment of a 
widely challenged statute, a single ruling might cause some lower courts 
to have to alter some of their rulings after the Supreme Court overturned 
their position on the law, as the Ninth Circuit had to do when new inter-
circuit conflict developed after Congress passed the Sentencing 
Guidelines Act and the Supreme Court upheld it in Mistretta v. United 
States.241
There are, however, areas of law in which a larger number of cases 
are at various stages of working their way through the court of appeals, 
such that even one Supreme Court ruling will have the range of effects 
seen here.  Some aspects of substantive criminal law would be among 
them, as would, certainly, aspects of criminal procedure, including 
effectiveness of counsel, aspects of search and seizure beyond those 
covered here, and federal habeas corpus procedure, rulings in all of 
which would potentially affect every one of state prisoners’ many efforts 
to test their state convictions in federal court.  Another such high-volume 
area would be immigration law, where the increase in appeals from 
agency rulings, most obviously in the Second Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit, has led to creation of means such as special screening panels to 
deal with that volume. 
The aftermath or “backwash” from the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Almeida-Sanchez well illustrates the dynamic interaction between the 
Supreme Court and a U.S. court of appeals, as well as the latter’s closely 
related internal dynamics as it coped with the effects of Almeida-Sanchez 
and its progeny.  The post-Almeida-Sanchez period also provides a look 
241 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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at interaction among court of appeals judges as they decide whether to 
hear a case en banc and the reasons why cases are heard en banc.  One 
also sees substantial use of unpublished dispositions, as the Ninth Circuit 
began its regular use of them during this period. 
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